For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV to eradicate their culture.2 Therefore, this narrative goes beyond a traditionally negative stereotype of the 'eastern' to colour all 'foreign' rulers with bleak colours.3 The narrative of sufffering is a simplistic but powerful, monochrome depiction of a past which is, on the contrary, very complex and far from monolithic. The projected idea of a solid Greek/Orthodox identity which roughly coincided with what in the nineteenth century was considered Greek space has far-reaching consequences, which extend far beyond the iterations of secondary school teachers in Greece and Cyprus. The understanding of identities as solid, unshifting and strictly defĳined structures constantly in conflict with each other-a modern construct-became a photo fĳilter through which some modern historians saw the world as it was before them, and before the 'fĳixer' of nationalism came to defĳine the very boundaries of those identities.4 The narrative of sufffering in turn strengthened the argumentation for modern-day political strife within the context of nationalist conflict in Cyprus.5
The impact of this 'retrograde' identity perception, and the consequent narratives, have defĳined the writing of Cypriot history. It is only in the last decade or so that this model was debunked in favour of more balanced approaches which offfer calmer and more deeply considered representations of the island's past. Despite these recent and more holistic approaches, the nationalist one is deeply rooted and can still be encountered, often in circumstances that are deeply ironic or outright self-contradictory.6 This is understandable, as the For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV nationalist rhetoric and the narrative of sufffering are deeply engrained in all levels of compulsory education in places like Greece and Cyprus, and attempts at changing the curriculum towards a more inclusive and less divisive content have been met with protests in Greece in the last decade.7
The history of Ottoman Cyprus became retrospectively the ideological battleground in the nationalist strife which characterised the island's postOttoman history.8 In these precisely drawn trenches of historiographical warfare, the post-Ottoman Church of Cyprus came to reinvent itself (much like its Balkan and Greek equivalents) as the protector of Greek identity, language and culture-a point perfectly illustrated in the mythology of the Krypho Scholeio9 (clandestine school)-reinforced with the now classic Gyzis painting depicting the holy father schooling the children by candlelight in the mores of the genos.10 That painting, and Ioannis Polemis' poem of the same name which the deep impact of Hellenic-centred norms even in the least likely of places. This coexistence of nationalist rhetoric and beliefs with Marxist ideology could be seen (and still can) within Cypriot communist circles. Philippou Strongos, Paul, Spanish Thermopylae: Cypriot Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, 1936 -39 (Perth: Tippermuir Books, 2010 . For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV followed, became the staple of Greek nationalism and fĳixed its perception of the Ottoman past with the role of the church and religion at its epicentre.11 This is part of a wider genre of history-writing: that which places the new, nation-state-approved church in the heart of the nation's survival in the previous years "under domination". The same model was used in the historiography of other Balkan nations. One need not scratch the surface too hard to fĳind the Serbian and Bulgarian examples: Zoltán Györe iterates that [D] uring the centuries in which the Serbian state did not exist, the main factor that preserved Serbian ethnic consciousness was the Serbian Orthodox Church with its broad organisation and its almost continuous and deliberate activity toward preserving cohesion and the memory of Nemanjićs state. It had a legally regulated position within the Turkish Empire with substantial autonomous jurisdictions that extended to secular as well as to religious and educational issues-to a certain point. As the bearer of an idea of Serbian statehood and a tradition of king-saints, the Serbian Orthodox Church persistently maintained awareness of the national identity and the glorious past and systematically developed a sense of religious solidarity among Serbs. To be of Serbian nationality meant to be of the Orthodox religion and to regard the Serbian state tradition as identical to belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church.12 11 The Church's renewed focus on its 'ethnarchic' identity coincided with a secularisation of Cypriot administration brought on by the British and therefore the need for a new political legitimisation which was justifĳied through reference to a past role which was invented. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV
The very idea of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus itself as a monolithic example of continuous existence through the centuries is problematic, much like the idea of national continuity. This model, adopted (and adapted) from its Balkan cognate nationalism, was introduced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with the writings of historians such as Philippou and Hackett, and went unchallenged by the more recent and equally influential historians such as Papadopoulos and Hill. The island's independence in 1960 and the short-lived coexistence of the two large communities which ended with the 1974 Athens-backed coup d'état and the Turkish invasion of the island, gave the duality of the island's histories fresh impetus. The old narrative of sufffering gained a fresh set of grievances which were used to accentuate those retrospective stereotypes further. However, the narrative of sufffering is not unique among Christian and Balkan nation-states. The same narrative was used in the rhetoric of Arab nationalists in the same period, focussing on salient points in the Arab-speaking populations' memory to justify the need for selfdetermination.13 Reinkowski speaks of a "histoire sainte", where "[A]ll peaks of Arab history were credited to the Arab nation, all low points were blamed on the Persians, Turks, or Europeans."14 This is the legacy of the twentieth century, which as Rothman puts it, created a "compartmentalization" of history as "nation-states sought to resurrect "their" histories".15
The late nineteenth century reinvention of the Orthodox Church both as an entity and as the diachronic curator of Greek identity, came to colour in vivid blue the historical representations of church, clergy, religion and state from the moment Richard Coeur-de-Lion set foot on the island to when the British left it in 1960, as this period was consequently a time when the 'rightful owner' of the physical and historical space was not seen to be politically dominant through the state. This meant that historians saw the island's medieval to preindependence history as a series of periods of tension, conflict and oppression For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV inflicted by the various rulers on its Greek Orthodox inhabitants. The same fĳilter was applied to Catholic and Ottoman rulers alike, with the latter being depicted in darker colours which mirror the modern conflict. The Catholic rulers were treated with the aggregating mentality of us versus them, with the important element that 'they' , being 'them' , were seen as being all of the same ilk or, at best, diffferent sides of the same coin. The fact that they may have been Frankish, Levantines, Catalans, Genoese, Venetians or whatever else, who all brought diffferent cultural, political (and even legal) elements to add to the island's tapestry, mattered very little, as their one, unifying characteristic was that they were most certainly diffferent to 'us' , something which justifĳied their perceived stance against the Orthodox: oppressive with a view to erasing it from the island's past and future. The story of the 13 Cypriot monks of Kantara, burned to the stake after denouncing the Catholics' use of unleavened bread as heretical-only to be denounced themselves as heretics, serves precisely as a salient point in the characterisation of the whole of the Frankish and Venetian periods as hostile to the local Greek Christians as a matter of policy. However, an incident like that "cannot be indicative of Latin attitudes in the Frankish period, since such a thing happened only once in three centuries of Frankish rule".16
The fact that the strife in 1950s Cyprus (and onwards) was between the Greek and Turkish nationalisms meant that the Ottoman period was viewed by Greek historians (mainly) through this lens as infĳinitely worse than its Catholic predecessor.17 The Ottoman period, was depicted as the darkest period in the history of the Greek 'nation' , tantamount to slavery. The role of the Church and the clergy was re-packaged for the needs of the modern, nationalist consumer as that of a heroic symbol of resistance which constantly sufffered the consequences of its 'ethnarchic' role. The role of the higher clergy and other Christian notables in the island's administration during Ottoman times was therefore downplayed, if not outright ignored, in favour of the narrative of 16 Schabel, Chris, Angel and Chris Schabel (eds.) For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV This repositioning of the clergy and Christian elite to fĳit the narrative of sufffering has meant that most mainstream historical research was carried out within those parameters, especially on the island and its nationalist mother ships, Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the island's rich and complex history from the medieval to the modern times was presented in monochrome simplicity which comes in handy in the times of shallow idealism and a football terracelevel of understanding of the nation's past. Any instances of acculturation and cultural amalgamation which were the norm in the patchwork of the island's cultural tapestry were quickly swept under the carpet in favour of the long view of the nation's unchanging culture, beliefs and value systems. For example, the period of 'fusion and confusion' which characterised the late medieval and even early Ottoman period, when there was signifĳicant inter-blending between what were supposedly fĳixed religious and cultural boundaries, was downplayed in favour of the 'Orthodox church as the sufffering safe-keeper of identity' paradigm. Likewise, the post-Venetian existence on the island of Orthodox higher clergymen and notables who treaded the very fĳine (to invisible) boundary between the Orthodox and the Catholic doctrines, and between loyalty to the Sultan and otherwise, was either not seen or seen as sporadic incidents which did not fĳit the norm.
The nationalist narrative has of course been criticised and rejected by now. However, the narrative which attempted to counter the nationalist formula has, in my view, gone too far in stressing the 'coexistence' of communities, whilst using the same value system to debunk it. The fact that coexistence occurred is often naively seen as proof that the diffferent 'elements' managed to coexist in peace despite the fact that they were diffferent, and by nature inclined to hatred and conflict. This well-meaning model is also of limited use, as it sees coexistence as the result of a conscious efffort made against the odds and realities, thereby implicitly using the same "oppositional framework" Paparrigopoulos, who For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV as its counter-narrative.20 Symbiosis and religious syncretism have therefore become a mirror of that oppositional framework, in that their use may suggest that historical conditions were either instances of deviation or conformity from well-defĳined norms.21 In the case of Cyprus, the rather nostalgic and romantic historiography of the left has sought to depict the Ottoman period in the same way it has depicted the pre-1950s period of coexistence and shared struggles amongst the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, especially during times of labour strife and union action.22
It is not the purpose of this article to propose a new set of analytical tools; that would go beyond the scope-and word limit. However, by looking at the history of early modern Cyprus, and the Mediterranean more widely, it becomes obvious that the current binary choice does not sufffĳice in attempting to understand the complex nature of relationships, identities, and the people who often found themselves shifting between confessional and political loyalties. This paper will deal with these people, the Cypriot elite of early Ottoman Cyprus and its varying degrees of acclimatisation and adaptation within the new realities that came with the conquest of 1571. I will demonstrate that the norm in Ottoman Cyprus, much like the norm in that other Cyprus before it, was not based on religious and ethnic perceptions, neither did it operate despite them. The norm, if we can stick to the one norm at all, was that the religious and ethnic dimensions were often driven or determined by social, political and economic factors-which transcended the ethno-religious realities. 20 The end of Venetian domination of Cyprus in 1571 brought with it a period of transition to a new era. Much has been said of conquest and change being not necessarily synonymous, and Cyprus' case is probably no diffferent. The one thing which has however had a catalytic role on this period was the fact that the Ottomans, at war with Venice until 1573, offfĳicially banished Catholicism from the island, at least until the peace treaty was signed. That, along with the passing to a system where the local patrician families' hitherto undisputed right to political and social prominence was no longer guaranteed, meant that those families had to flee the island or reinvent themselves in order to achieve political survival. It would be naïve to believe that signifĳicant numbers from the old elite did not become co-opted into the new administration. After all, the need for experienced and capable locals to help run the island was a pragmatic driver which offfered opportunities for old masters to become new ones. Their knowledge of networks, geography and, crucially, the fĳiscal realities of the island, would have been invaluable to the Ottomans. There is some evidence of conversion to Islam, which is perhaps sketchy, but exists none the less. One of those questions which are perhaps impossible to answer is whether the fĳirst Ottoman detailed cadastral survey, undertaken just after the 1571 conquest, was drafted with the help of locals with the know-how of the land and its productivity. This is suggested by the eighteenth-century historian of Cyprus, Kyprianos, who names certain noblemen such as Livio Podocataro, Scipio Carafffa, Pier Paolo Synclitico, Giovanni Muscorno, Orsatto Lusignan, Flatro Flatro and the De Nores brothers, Giannetto and Ettore among others who had surrendered and were ransomed, some of whom were rumoured to have become members of the sipahi.23
The limited opportunities for these old patricians on the island were mainly available as part of the new administration, and often after conversion to Islam. Another option open to them would be to become dragomans, or higher clergymen in the newly-established Greek Orthodox Church on the island. The direct outcome of this is that the period from the conquest until the For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV late seventeenth century is characterised by the steady contacts between those higher clergymen and other notables with Catholic states and the Vatican itself, often afffĳirming their faith to the Catholic Church and appealing for support and even intervention by these Latin powers with a view to a reconquista of Cyprus. Archbishop Timotheos (1572-87) was one of many higher clergymen who had a fluctuating and frequently re-negotiated identity outlook. In October 1587 he was a co-signatory to a letter to Philip ii of Spain, pleading for Spanish intervention for the 'liberation of the island' . In his letter, Timotheos claims that a group of notables, bishops, clergymen and monks of the island, under oath, subscribe to his plea for intervention.24 The letter claimed that there were 65,000 Christians on the island ready to take up arms at the sight of the Spanish Armada, in order to counter the Ottoman garrisons of 6,000 men in total to achieve liberation.25 The Spanish Council of State convened in May 1588 and considered the letter, concluding that a campaign to Cyprus would be at the time impossible, but to inform the clergyman/messenger26 that a future campaign may be possible, offfering words of encouragement.27 This information was to be conveyed orally, as a written promise or commitment to future action would jeopardise the lives of those on the island should it fall in the wrong hands. It also agreed to support the messenger with the costs of his journey.28 This attempt was in no way an isolated incident. It formed part of a postOttoman conquest reality, whereby the new Greek Orthodox higher clergy had a positively pro-Catholic stance, and often engaged in appeals to various Catholic states. We also have the phenomenon of Cypriot notables who scattered across the kingdoms and states of Catholic Europe, looking for support, accommodation and a new political and social future. Inevitably, some of these people were drawn by the rampant and overt manner in which the Habsburgs and the Spanish kingdom in particular projected an image of defenders of the 24 During this period, reports on the feasibility of an attempted reconquista were circulating. Giovanni Santa Maura, "nobile ciprioto", writing from Naples in 1578, compiled a report (in Italian) on the fĳinances and production of Cyprus, but most crucially on the Janissary revolt which resulted in the death of governor Arap Ahmet, describing it as a potential opportunity for intervention by Spain. The report also mentioned the fĳigures between 52,000 and 62,000 men who could take up arms against the local garrison with support from Spain. These reports were met with suspicion and lack of credulity by the Spanish, who considered them to be exaggerated and decided against any action.36
The 'intelligence' which reported that thousands of Cypriots were ready to take up arms was reiterated with great frequency, and was received with incredulity and suspicion. In 1606, a certain Don Pedro Avendaño, "griego de naçion", sent a report to the court of King Philip iii of Spain, claiming that he had led a rebellion in Cyprus in which 12,000 "Christian Greeks" had taken part and caused casualties of more than 3,500 Turks. However, not having arms to sustain their struggle, they had to retreat to the mountains and were waiting for intervention by a "Christian prince".37 Once again the Spanish Council of State agreed to avoid committing to any action, while at the same time offfering encouragement and vague promises to Avendaño. However, in the subsequent failed raid on Famagusta by a joint Tuscan and Spanish corsair force in the summer of 1607, there was a concrete expectation on the part of the leaders, and especially Don Pedro Téllez-Girón y Velasco, the future Duke of Ossuna and Viceroy of Naples and Sicily, who persisted in a futile attempt to fĳind the local Greeks who were to take up arms.38
In 1608, the Dragoman of Cyprus Piero Goneme wrote to the court of the Duchy of Savoy, urging the Duke to assist in the liberation of the island.39 In 1609, an appeal written and signed in Greek by Archbishop Christodoulos, his bishops and other higher clergymen, refers to the "great tyranny sufffered" as a result of both a previous rebellion (that of Avendaño presumably) and the 35 Further appeals to the King of Spain followed in 161144 and 161345 and were discussed until at least 1623, without any indication that the Spanish took them seriously or that they were considering an intervention. At the same time, the Cypriot higher clergy, and Archbishop Christodoulos in particular, were also pleading with the Duchy of Savoy, citing their historical relationship with the Crown of Cyprus as added incentive for an intervention. Appeals to Savoy were sent in 1609, 1611, 1617 and 1632, in all of which Christodoulos had a part. 46 Another one was sent in 1668 by Archbishop Nikiphoros. According to Hill, this was to be the last recorded appeal by the Cypriot clergy to Catholic powers for intervention, and it signifĳied a shift in the position of the higher clergy within Ottoman administration. 47 The above appeals, whether sincere expressions of hope and despair by the remnants of a Venetian past, or power games intended to reinforce the hold on power and wealth of local players, can perhaps be seen as evidence of a certain For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV fluidity in terms of identities on the island. This would go against the monolithic narrative of nationalist historiography, but would also not paint a whole picture. What we have in post-Venetian Cyprus cannot simply be defĳined as identity fluidity. Rather, it is a situation where identity and identities were flexible, negotiable concepts; at times fluid and at times rigid, depending on the situation. The fact that the-at least in name-island's Greek Orthodox archbishops could accommodate both Greek Orthodox (schismatic in the eyes of their Catholic opposites) and pro-Catholic (overtly or covertly) tendencies without a hint of contradiction demonstrates that the identity choice was far from binary and monochrome, but rather a complex issue which cannot be examined in isolation without taking into consideration the socio-economic conditions which required subtlety.
Counter-Reformation and Its Transposition to Cyprus
The period of confessionalisation, as it came to be known, brought with it an impetus on the part of the Catholic Church which created new realities in a confessionally contested space such as Cyprus.48 The creation of Propaganda Fide in 1622 and its missionary activity in Europe and the Ottoman Empire came to both reinforce and at the same time challenge the realities on Cyprus.49 It is at this juncture that the Cypriot notables' appeals for support and intervention found a new target. The Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide in Rome started receiving reports and appeals from those in Cyprus who had Catholic sympathies and an interest in the strengthening of the Catholic presence on the island. In 1625 the Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus sent a report to Rome with information on the island's population and the condition in which the island's Catholics found themselves after the Ottoman conquest. The archbishop decried the lack of spiritual and material support, especially for the Maronites, who fĳind themselves in hardship and had their churches taken by the Greeks. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV response to the report.50 These were followed with the dispatch of two Jesuit missionaries.51
The beginning of Vatican's involvement in Cyprus, followed by the French Capuchin missions later in the seventeenth century created a new dynamic which was to prolong the feelings of split loyalties amongst the local elites. The perseverance of appeals and declarations of faith almost 100 years after the island passed to the Ottomans cannot be simply the manifestation of transitional identities and nostalgia for the past. Appealing to Catholic Europe had become almost a norm to be adhered to, and was perhaps an indication of much more than just anxiety and eagerness to return to the Catholic fold.
The Propaganda Fide archives are very revealing as to the extent and nature of the relationships between Rome and Cyprus. In 1625, the local Catholics, including French and Venetian merchants, requested the appointment of a bishop to oversee the Catholic faith on the island. Initially the idea was dismissed, as, in the words of the Jesuit Domenico Mauritio "this is no place for a Latin bishop" on account of the lack of a sufffĳicient Catholic congregation to support the appointment.52 This decision was met with the protests of the Catholics of Cyprus. The position of Rome shifted after a letter by a certain Francesco Locatello53 in 1629, in which he made spectacular claims as to the feasibility and potential of the Catholic cause on the island. He claimed that he himself had great influence over the Paşa of the island, since one of his sons had married the Paşa's daughter, who subsequently converted to Catholicism with the Paşa's consent. Locatello also claims that two of his sons lived as Greeks, and that Archbishop Christodoulos was his nephew, while his other two sons lived as Latins (including the Paşa's son-in-law).54 Locatello also wrote to a clergyman nephew of his, Pietro Vespa of Venice, and encouraged him to 50 Tsirpanlis, Zacharias, Ανέκδοτα Έγγραφα εκ των Αρχείων του Βατικανού, 1625 -1667 (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1973 , pp. 1-3 (Unpublished documents from the Vatican archives 1625-1667). Tsirpanlis' collection of documents from the De Propaganda Fide archives is of paramount importance. 51 Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, pp. 9-10. 52 Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 17; "qui non è luogo per un vescovo latino, nè vi è entrata alcuna, perche ogni casa si dissipò". 53 Also encountered as Lucatello or Lucadello. 54 "Due de miei fĳiglioli si hanno datto a vivere alla greca, et l'arcivescovo Greco è mio nipote; li altri doi vivono alla latina et uno ha presso per moglie la fĳiglia del Bassa, et uno schiavo l'ha battezata secretamente; et il Bassa è tanto huomo da bene, che se fosse proceduto, subito di quanto desideriamo, certo che si potrebbe batezare ancora lui secretamente". Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 23. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV put himself forward for the bishop's position, advising him that the merchants were rich and would easily sustain his position.55 It is impossible to assess whether Locatello's claims were true or simply exaggerated in order to cause the appointment of a Catholic bishop in Cyprus. Particularly the claim that the Paşa's daughter had been allowed to convert to Catholicism seems rather implausible and should not be taken at face value. Regardless of the plausibility, however, his intervention brought the result he wanted: Pietro Vespa was appointed Bishop of Paphos and was instructed to move to Cyprus, especially since Locatello was believed to have had a great deal of influence on the Paşa, something which would facilitate the establishment of Vespa on the island.56
His appointment and subsequent arrival in the latter half of 162957 was met with a mixture of reactions. Vespa was well received by the merchant community based in Larnaca, and soon set out on a tour of the island in order to establish the state of the Catholic faith in all regions, urban and rural. Outside Nicosia and Larnaca he found that any remnants of Catholicism were out of necessity (according to Vespa) engaged in a relationship with the Greek rite. Apart from the Maronite community, which was well served by its own clergy and archbishop, Catholics in the countryside just went to Greek mass or had to travel to the cities for confession or communion.58 This 'necessity' is a dangerous assumption which suggests that the absence of Catholic clergy was solely responsible for the communication and exchange between Catholic and Greek Christians. However, this would do injustice to the possibility that this coexistence was not an abnormal departure from what Vespa considered the norm, but a valid and original characteristic of a vibrant and dynamic society in transition.
In his fĳirst report, Vespa found that the numbers of 'overt' Catholics were very low, but he claimed that many Greeks he spoke to received him with great courtesy and indicated their "desire to be united with our Holy Roman Church and willingness to recognise our High Pontifff as true vicar of Christ and legitimate successor of Saint Peter".59 Vespa went on to repeat that 55 Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, . 56 "potentissimo col Bassà e col detto arcivescovo Greco"; Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 25. 57 It is worth noting that the whole process took almost 5 years. 58 This was the case with some Catholic families in Limassol, who stated that they travelled to Larnaca for confession or communion, offfered by the Franciscan monks there. These were presumably those appointed in 1625; Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 36. 59 "li Greci, quali generalmente mostrano ardente desiderio di star uniti con la nostra Santa
Chiesa Romana e di voler conoscere il Sommo Pontefĳice per vero vicario di Christo, e legitimo successo di San Pietro"; Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 49. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV oft-repeated estimation that the island could easily be taken from the Turks, given this support. In Nicosia, Vespa had meetings with both Archbishop Christodoulos and the Paşa and reported that he was well received by both. According to his report, Archbishop Christodoulos confĳirmed his pro-Catholic sentiments by stating that he considered the Pope the supreme leader of Christianity, superior to the Greek Patriarch. This was accompanied by a letter, bearing Christodoulos' sigil, which expressed his and his bishops' reverence towards the Pope and his recognition as the "universal pastor of the flock of Christ".60 This corroborates the evidence from the Spanish archives in identifying Archbishop Christodoulos and three bishops as pro-Catholic, at least when it came to their interactions with Catholic Europe. Benedetto da Bassano, a Franciscan missionary writing from Rome in 1638, reiterated that Christodoulos and three of his bishops could possibly convert to Catholicism, while the Bishop of Limassol represented the most difffĳicult case, signifying perhaps underlying currents and conflicts within the Greek Orthodox higher clergy.61 Ultimately, da Bassano considered the Archbishop's pro-Catholic sentiments-as expressed in his letter-as the gateway to potentially reaching and taking hold of "all the souls of the Kingdom".62
Going back to Vespa, despite his initial positive reception, he soon found that his arrival and presence had threatened the status quo within the existing Catholic presence on the island. The Maronites protested the fact that Vespa was appointed to administer and oversee all Catholic presence and churches on the island, including theirs, only for their protest to be ignored by Pope Urban viii who confĳirmed the appointment in October 1629.63 It is clear that beyond the theological guidance and support, the Maronite community and especially its leadership, did not want to be 'managed' by an 'outsider' , but were perhaps hoping that their role could be elevated. Or it could even be a simple reaction to having to support fĳinancially the new post.
Vespa also encountered great hostility and resistance by the Franciscan monks in Larnaca, who refused to believe the authenticity of his documents and his appointment, and questioned his authority. When Vespa set out on his For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV island tour, the Franciscans wrote to the Paşa accusing Vespa of being a spy of the Catholic Church, having arrived with huge sums of money. The result of this was that a few days after Vespa's meeting with the Paşa, he was again summoned and interrogated on the basis of the Franciscans' accusations. Vespa denied everything, but was told in no uncertain terms that his presence on the island was subject to a tribute amounting to half of what the Greek Archbishop had to pay: 1,500 kuruş.64 With this development Vespa found that the support from the Catholic resident and merchant community disappeared, as "la natione" did not want to pay the tribute demanded by the Paşa-once more economic considerations had taken precedence over religious afffĳiliation. Vespa concluded his visit by leaving the island in secret, in case he was detained on account of his not having paid the tribute. He went to Crete, where he found orders instructing him to go to Aleppo and Palestine.65 He soon returned to the island to assume his post, and stayed there until his death in 1655, whereupon he was replaced by Giovanni Batista da Todi, a member of the Franciscan mission in Cyprus. Vespa's time was characterised by a power struggle between himself, the Maronites and the Franciscans, and his initial dispute with the latter lasted at least a decade, if not until his death. The difffĳiculties he encountered come as a surprise if one considers the tone of Locatello's letter and the promises of support from all and sundry. The crude reality on the ground was that the new appointment came as a challenge to the existing status quo, encountering resistance from those whose powers would be limited as a result. It would also appear that the Paşa's expected pro-Catholic stance did not really materialise beyond a lukewarm acceptance of the new archbishop-provided that the tribute he expected was paid. On the whole, Vespa's coming, as an outsider, to a space with defĳined or contested power relationships and networks may have been the cause of his initial struggles. However, the fact that he persevered until his death in 1655 is proof that he must at least have come to some kind of compromise or resolution with other parties.
Another member of the post-Venetian Cypriot elite was Pietro Flatro, a doctor who was a scion of a "principal casa di questo Regno" who was educated in Padua and returned to Cyprus, where he lived as a Greek Orthodox until he was converted by da Todi. It appears that he still led a double life, out of fear of persecution for his Catholic faith.66 Flatro was the personal physician of Archbishop Christodoulos, and wrote a series of letters on the subject of faith to da Todi. He afffĳirmed his and the Archbishop's Catholic faith, 64 Vespa uses "piastre". 65 Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 54. 66 Tsirpanlis, Βατικανό, p. 81. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV and pointed out the difffĳiculties in overtly expressing it due to the fears mentioned earlier. Flatro remained by Christodoulos' side even after Parthenios ousted him from the Archepiscopal throne for a year in 1639-40, after which Christodoulos, now an old man, returned and remained in post until his death. His successor, Nikiphoros, also had Flatro by his side, and like his predecessor Christodoulos he afffĳirmed his faith in the Catholic Church in a letter sent by Flatro to the Franciscan mission in 1650.67 Nikiphoros had simply carried on Christodoulos' accommodation and overt courting of the Catholic missions. In 1650 Nikophoros and the Bishop of Paphos Gabriel had once more declared their faith and recognition of the Pope, prompting the Franciscan missionary Benedetto di Lauro to request the Vatican for expressions of support towards them.68 Di Lauro also mentions in a letter of his that Nikiphoros invited him to attend synod meetings, something which raises many interesting questions as to the theology practised by the Greek Orthodox higher clergy at the time. 69 Of the Greek Orthodox higher clergy in the period up to 1670 it must be said that positions were fĳirmly in the grip of a post-Venetian pro-Catholic Cypriot elite. This became quickly evident, when the fĳirst archbishop to be appointed immediately after the Ottoman conquest, who was reportedly a Syrian clergyman who "bought" the post from the Grand Vizier, was quickly "ousted" in favour of a local patrician called Timotheos of Acre.70 Timotheos, who as we saw earlier was very active in his contacts and appeals for liberation of Cyprus, is clearly defĳined by Kyprianos as a "monk from the noble Cypriot house of Acre".71 The d' Acre patrician family of Cyprus was well known in the Frankish and Venetian periods, and it is very possible that Timotheos was a descendant of the Lusignan family. This demonstrates the considerable control former patricians had on the 'new' post of Greek Orthodox archbishop and the bishoprics.72 This explains why, although nominally under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul, the Greek Orthodox archbishops of Cyprus maintained such a pro-Catholic stance. Indeed, the turn towards Istanbul, both doctrinal and political, was not the direct result of the For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Patriarchate's activity, but the result of wider processes within the Ottoman state and the Mediterranean, as we will see below.
The arrival of the Fransiscan, Jesuit and Capuchin missions in Cyprus, and the dispatch of Vespa as Propaganda Fide's bishop, brought to the island the makings of a power struggle which straddled state and faith boundaries in confessionalisation-period Europe. The missions in Cyprus had to compete with the bishop and each other for the alms and fees the merchants paid towards their sustenance, and had to jostle with each other to claim as great a soul (and coin) share as possible. Vespa's difffĳiculties with the missionaries, was perhaps a replication in miniature of a similar situation which existed in Istanbul, one which mirrored the complex world of intra-faith and inter-state rivalries. 73 The confessionalisation dynamic and its drive of missionaries to Cyprus was initially facilitated by, and ultimately intertwined with the irredentist feelings (both covert and overt) of the post-Venetian Catholic elite which was seen to aspire to the island's 'liberation' from the Ottomans.
Missionary activities had mainly two purposes. The fĳirst was to protect and safeguard the existing Catholic community on the island, including the merchants who either visited or lived there. The second purpose tied in with the overall aims of the confessionalisation movement, aiming to acquire new souls for the faith, using some good, old-fashioned catechism. To that extent, the Franciscan da Todi requested in 1650 that theological books in Latin and Greek be sent to Cyprus for the mission's purposes.74 A consignment of books arrived in 1662, with a very distinct topic being the Council of Florence, as it was certainly intended to be the main crux of discussions and arguments aiming at co-opting Greek Christians into the Catholic faith. 75 
Ilarion Kigalas and the Turn towards Istanbul
Ilarion Kigalas was born in Cyprus in 1624 and was baptised in Ayia Napa after the Greek Orthodox rite.77 Ilarion and his brother Ioannis were educated at the Greek College of St. Athanasios in Rome, whose purpose was to educate Greek/Eastern clergymen in an efffort to educate Greek flocks in the East and "facilitate the reunion of the schismatical churches".78 He became rector of the Greek College in Padua, but left under a dispute to establish schools in Cephalonia and Istanbul in 1660.
In 1674 Ilarion was appointed Archbishop of Cyprus, an appointment which caused a negative reaction amongst the local clergy, especially because of his close ties with the Capuchins and his appointment of Kosmas Mavroudis as Bishop of Limassol. Mavroudis was an ambitious clergyman, who was previously a vicar to the Patriarch of Alexandria but had professed his support and devotion to the Catholic faith.79 Ilarion Kigalas and his brother Ioannis were active exponents of the Catholic cause and had strong links with the Propaganda Fide.
Ilarion's presence in Cyprus before his appointment was marked by a decree by the local Greek synod condemning Calvinism in 1668, which was presided over by his predecessor Nikiphoros and instigated by Kigalas himself.80 This decree, and Kigalas' subsequent appointment in 1670 points to a more daring and direct approach by the Catholic Church to influence matters on the island at the highest level. However, it seems that the gamble not only failed, but also signifĳied the beginning of the end of this period of direct influence over and communication with Greek hierarchs of Cyprus. Kigalas' authority was For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV disputed directly, and he had to appeal to the sharia court of Nicosia in ca. 1676 because three other clergymen told him directly that they did not want him as archbishop.81 Kigalas was reafffĳirmed as the rightful Archbishop, using his berat to good efffect, but his tenure did not last very long. He resigned probably in 1678, and died in Istanbul. 82 Kigalas' activity and the anti-Calvinist synod of 1668 sit well within the context of the reformation and counter-reformation movements, and their impact on the Eastern Church. Reformist and conservative Greek Orthodox leaders often had to take a position which was either pro-reformation or more closely aligned to that of the Catholic Church, as the religious dispute carried over into the Ottoman lands. 83 It is widely believed that the end of Kigalas' tenure marked a shift in the Greek Christian hierarchy of Cyprus towards a more involved role in Ottoman administration. This view is supported by both Kyprianos and Hill, and the reason for it is reportedly an imperial order which recognized the Greek clergy as representatives of the island's Greek Christian population.84 It is true that the evidence we have suggests that higher clergymen became more directly involved in Ottoman administration and tax-collection in particular. However, the reasons for the end of appeals and declarations of faith must be more complex and remain to be clearly defĳined.
Conclusion
What we have in seventeenth-century Ottoman Cyprus can be summarised as the interplay between social, economic and political/religious factors at the conjecture of three historical processes: the post-conquest search for a political future of the Venetian elite, the lukewarm imperial (or piratical) aspirations of Catholic states and the counter-reformation and consequent dispatch to the island of Catholic missionaries. The Ottoman conquest, and increasingly the For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV memory of the Ottoman conquest, gave rise to a Cypriot version of a phenomenon which was not new: that of itinerant or sedentary peddlers of a narrative of sufffering, pleading for redemption from the Ottoman 'yoke' . This local and exported irredentism pandered to the more-or-less serious imperial ambitions of Spain and the Italian city-states. At its most serious, it resulted in a comical attempt at capturing (or pillaging) Famagusta which as we know ended in failure. However, those peddlers of loyalty and allegiance seem to have persevered with their narrative, embellishing it as time went on. This phenomenon can only be interpreted as favour-seeking on the part of Cypriot notables and refugees from the War of Cyprus. The appeals on the one hand and the discussions on the other of a potential campaign to capture Cyprus eventually fĳizzled out as the seventeenth century wore on. As the Cypriot Greek Orthodox notables and higher clergy became more involved (and identifĳied) with the Ottoman administration, it became increasingly evident that politically and fĳinancially their future lay in investing in the island's administration and economy, namely taxation and the production and trade of cash crops such as silk and cotton. We have evidence that the involvement of dragomans and higher clergymen in those administrative and economic processes intensifĳied after the 1640s.85 This coincided with a change in the island's administrative status: after the conquest it was invested with the status of the centre of an independent province (beylerbeyilik). This was rather relegated after 1640, when the economic conditions could not support the presence of three paşas on the island, who were then reduced to one. In 1670, the island became an independent province within the Kapudan Paşa's domains, a move which-according to the eighteenth-century historian Kyprianos-gave wider powers to the local Ottoman elite and especially the island's ağas.86 This development added further impetus to the 'consolidation' of the island's elite and the diffferent power groups within.87 This may in turn have led the local Greek Orthodox higher clergy to begin rejecting the pro-Catholic stance of the earlier decades, as we saw in the cases of Kigalas and Mavroudes.
The fĳinal conquest of Candia in 1669 may have put the eastern part of the Mediterranean beyond the reach of even the most ambitious Catholic states. This development had undoubtedly created another barrier in the conceptualisation of what was possible in terms of imperial ambition on the part of Spain, but especially the Italian states. The year 1670 becomes a symbolic landmark 85 See Hadjianastasis, "Bishops". 86 Kyprianos, Ιστορία, . Hadjikyriacou offfers great detail on the administrative status of the island; Hadjikyriacou, Antonis, "Society and Economy on an Ottoman Island: Cyprus in the Eighteenth Century", PhD Thesis (London: soas, 2011), pp. 122-28. 87 Hadjianastasis, "Consolidation", p. 87. For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV in that the irredentist, imperialist and confessionalist ambitions which met in Cyprus all come to an end by this date.
The conquest of 1570-71 gave what Arbel and Costantini described as religious syncretism88 in sixteenth-century Cyprus a new impetus, as former Catholics became crypto-Catholics and retained offfĳices and places within the island's elite. As the post-conquest pleas and appeals for liberation were perhaps beginning to fade with the passage of time, the seventeenth century aggressive introduction of missionary activity (alongside merchant politics) came as a boost to what by then became a tradition based on pre-existing practice and memory. Cypriot Orthodox higher clergymen continued appealing to Catholic courts not as a direct result of the Ottoman conquest, but perhaps because of the creation of a tradition which expected them to do so. Religious syncretism, irredentism and crypto-Catholicism became elements of instances of political opportunism on the part of those seeking to gain or expand power on an island whose political regime was in a state of flux.
We have seen that the narrative of fĳixed identities in direct competition or in a relationship of conflict and domination, the staple of nationalist histories, was countered with a new narrative of syncretism, fluidity, symbiosis. It is my position that the latter narrative has been, at its core, based on the same analytical tools as the one it came to challenge. The declarations of faith and allegiance to the Pope and Catholicism undertaken by Greek Orthodox archbishops and bishops still raise eyebrows. That is because the analytical tools at the disposal of historians were deeply influenced by the same modernist understanding of identity as those of nationalist and anti-nationalist historians. Understanding the early modern Mediterranean as a space of fluidity between defĳined identities is inherently problematic, as it reinforces the same oppositional framework it is attempting to replace. Speaking of symbiosis still suggests that on the ground there was still a clear understanding that symbiosis, syncretism and coexistence were still a departure from what was considered 'normal' . In my view, it is highly debatable whether 'normal' was a fĳixed state at all. Rather, it was a constantly negotiable and moving set of characteristics, heavily dependent on context.89
